Sunset Boulevard

(Some balance after 3 dry-as-dust posts about politics). 


Autumn, read John Clare's poem "Decay", think about transience and watch Sunset Boulevard. What can be more perfect? 
The film is brilliant, by the way, astounding. Right when I thought nothing could impress me, for a while, after On the Waterfront, here Billy Wilder's working his magic again. Norma Desmond (Gloria Swanson) is an ageing, forgotten silent film star living in the past and dreaming of a comeback, a blend of Margo Channing (Bette Davis) in All About Eve and Blanche DuBois (Vivien Leigh) in A Streetcar Named Desire and Miss Havisham in Dickens's Great Expectations. Joe Gillis (William Holden) is an unemployed and perhaps not very talented screenwriter- in character, quite similar to Bud (Jack Lemmon) in The Apartment, who does wrong things for money but who, retaining some dignity and hating himself for what he does, "rebels" in the end. 
Sunset Boulevard makes The Artist, an excellent film that is also about a forgotten silent film star, pale in comparison- it's realistic, sad and heartbreaking, without being bitter. Like The Artist, it deals with loss of fame and the refusal to face reality, but because the star is a woman, the film also tackles ageing (she wants a young man to assure herself that she's still attractive), illusions, unrequited love, jealousy, etc. and pushes it all further by making Norma descend into madness. Perfect plot, deeply sad story, good dialogue (like other Billy Wilder films I've watched such as The Apartment, Some Like It Hot, Sabrina, etc.*) and powerful performances by the 2 leading actors, Sunset Boulevard has 2 other memorable characters, juxtaposed, Betty Schaefer, a young writer full of hopes and aspirations and Max, a once-great director now reduced to working as a butler to the woman he made a star and was married to. These 2 characters add more layers to Billy Wilder's dissection of the film industry, and more brilliance to a wonderful film. As Time put it, this is a story of Hollywood at its worst told by Hollywood at its best. 
Highly recommended. If you have watched it already, I believe it's time to see it again. 






*: In his review of Sunset Boulevard, Roger Ebert wrote "Of all the great directors of Hollywood's golden age, has anybody made more films that are as fresh and entertaining to this day as Billy Wilder's? The credits are astonishing: Double Indemnity, Ace in the Hole, Some Like It Hot, The Apartment, The Lost Weekend, Stalag 17, Witness for the Prosecution, Sabrina. And who else can field two contenders among the greatest closing lines of all time? From Some Like It Hot there is "Nobody's perfect." And from Sunset Boulevard, Norma Desmond's: "There's nothing else. Just us, and the cameras, and those wonderful people out there in the dark. All right, Mr. De Mille, I'm ready for my closeup."" That is so true. But Roger Ebert forgot The Apartment: "Shut up and deal". 

Do you hear the people sing?

Occupy Central in Hong Kong:


(French original in Les Misérables: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HRp-Opp2Peg
English version in the 2012 film: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMYNfQlf1H8) 


Stay strong, Hong Kong. You're not alone. 
Please sign this petition to show your support: http://occupyhk.wesign.it/en
Thank you. 

Notes from "Elections and Electoral Systems"

Chapter 13 of Principles of Comparative Politics (William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder and Sona Nadenichek Golder)

- Electoral system: set of laws that regulate electoral competition between candidates or parties or both. 
Electoral formula: how votes are translated into seats. 
Ballot structure: how electoral choices are presented on the ballot paper (vote for candidates or parties or both, cast a single vote or express a series of preferences). 
District magnitude: number of representatives elected in a district. 
- Universal suffrage: the right to vote isn't restricted by race, gender, belief or social status. 
But: restrictions based on age, mental health, citizenship, country residency, prison sentences, etc. 

- Different systems: 



I/ Majoritarian electoral systems: 
- The candidates/ parties with the most votes win. 
Absolute majority or plurality. 

- Single-member district plurality system: individuals cast a single vote for a candidate in a single-member district=> candidate with the most votes is elected. 
e.g the UK. 
+ advantages: 

• simple, easy to understand 
• low in cost 
• 1 representative/ constituency=> responsible=> incentive to perform well 
• no representation of extremist parties 

+ disadvantages: 

• extremely unrepresentative outcomes 
• wasted votes
• encouraging individuals to vote strategically rather than in accordance with their true preferences 

- Alternative vote: in single-member districts, voters mark their preferences by rank ordering candidates=> absolute majority: win=> no candidate wins absolute majority: candidate with fewest votes is eliminated=> votes reallocated.... until 1 candidate has an absolute majority. 
e.g Australia. 
+ advantages: 

• 1 representative/ constituency=> responsible and accountable=> incentive to perform well 
• chance to convey information about preferences 
• less incentive to vote strategically 
• help candidates/ parties win not only votes of base supporters but also 2nd preferences of others

+ disadvantages: 

• allow candidates to win who don't have majority support (reallocated=> not genuine)
• complicated to understand
• costly 

- Borda count: in single- or multi member districts, voters use numbers to mark their preferences (1=> 0,9=> 0,8=> 0,7, etc.)=> values are summed=> candidate with the most valuable votes is elected. 
+ advantages: 

• attractive in highly divided society 

+ disadvantages: 

• incentive to vote strategically, engage in compromising and burying 

- 2-round systems: potential for 2 rounds of elections. Candidates/ parties are automatically elected in the 1st round if they obtain a specified level of votes, typically an absolute majority. Those that win the most votes in the 2nd round are elected. 
+ 2 types: 
Majority-runoff 2-round system: 2nd round=> top 2 vote winners. 
Majority-plurality 2-round systems: 2nd round=> all candidates who overcome some preordained threshold of votes. 
e.g France (however, often choose to withdraw the less popular candidates in order not to split support). 
+ advantages: 

• more choice, chance for voters to change their mind
• less incentive to vote strategically 
• incentive for candidates who make it into the 2nd round to reach compromises with those already eliminated to win over their supporters 

+ disadvantages: 

• costly 
• disproportional translation of votes into seats (most disproportional of all systems used in Western democracies) 
• hurt minority representation 

- Supplementary vote: used in single-member districts. 
2 columns. 1st column: most preferred candidate. 2nd colume: 2nd choice. 
A candidate who wins an absolute majority of the 1st-preference votes=> automatically elected. If not=> 2 leading candidates remain, all others are eliminated=> 2nd-preference votes are reallocated to determine the winner. 
=> like majority-runoff TRS but only 1 round of voting. 
=> less costly. 
e.g Sri Lanka. 

- Single non-transferable vote: voters cast a single candidate-centred vote in a multimember district=> candidates with highest number of votes are elected. 
=> equivalent of SMDP. 
+ n seats to be filled=> win if having 1/ (n+1) of the votes. 
+ advantages: 

• more proportional outcomes
• representation of smaller parties and minority ethnic groups

+ disadvantages: 

• also compete against candidates from their own party=> intraparty fighting, factionalisation=> weaken parties
• centred on candidate characteristics rather than policy differences
• voter confusion 
• bribes to interest groups
• favour incumbent and well-organised parties
• not depend on transfer of preference votes=> less incentive to build broad-based coalition=> need not moderate political message (more extremist rhetoric)

- Block vote: in multimember districts, voters give as many votes as they like (except: 1 vote to any 1 candidate)=> candidates with highest number of votes are elected. 
Party block vote: also in multimember districts, but voters have only a single vote, and allocate it to a list of party candidates rather than an individual candidate=> party with most votes wins all district seats. 
e.g Singapore 
=> highly disproportional outcomes 

II/ Proportional electoral systems: 
- n% of votes=> n% of seats. 

- advantages: 

• proportional outcomes 
• representation of small parties 
• essential for ethnically and religiously divided societies 

- disadvantages: 

• may replicate bitter societal division within the legislature without creating incentive for cooperation and accommodation 
• tend to produce coalition governments=> hard to identify who's responsible 
• representation of small, extremist parties=> undermine democracy 
• weak link between constituents and representatives because no single representative is responsible for policy in a given district

- List PR system: each party represents a list of candidates for a multimember district=> parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the votes. 
+ Based on quota (number of votes that guarantees a party a seat in a particular electoral district) or divisor (divides total number of votes won by each party in a district by a series of numbers to obtain quotients=> district seats are allocated according to which parties have the highest quotients). 
+ Electoral threshold: minimum level of support a party needs to obtain representation. 
Natural threshold: mathematical by-product of electoral system. 
Formal threshold: explicitly written into electoral law. 
=> Apparentement: provision in a list PR system for 2 or more separate parties to reach an agreement that their votes will be combined for the purposes of seat allocation (small parties group together to surpass the threshold). 
+ Closed party list: order of candidates elected is determined by the party itself. 
Open/ preferential/ unblocked party list: voters can indicate not just their preferred party but also their favoured candidate within that party. 
Free party list: voters have multiple votes that they can allocate either within a single party or across different party lists (=> intraparty fighting). 

- Single transferable vote: multimember districts. 
preference (like AV, SV, BC)=> candidates that surpass a specified quota of 1st-preference votes are immediately elected=> in successive counts: votes from eliminated candidates and surplus votes from elected candidates are reallocated to the remaining candidates until all the seats are filled. 
+ advantages: 

• convey information about preferences
• minimise wasted votes
• less incentive to vote strategically 
• allow voters to vote for candidates from different parties
• incentive for candidates to appeal to groups outside core set of supporters 
• more proportional outcomes than majoritarian systems 
• candidate-centred system=> strong link between representatives and constituents 

+ disadvantages: 

• weaken parties, make them less cohesive
• incentive for members of the same party to campaign against each other (though not much, because of the transference of votes) 
• hard to operate in large districts
• less proportional than list PR 

III/ Mixed electoral systems: voters elect representatives through 2 different systems, 1 majoritarian and 1 proportional. 
- Independent mixed electoral system: the majoritarian and proportional components of the electoral system are implemented independent of 1 another. 
Dependent mixed electoral system: the application of the proportional formula is dependent on the distribution of seats or votes produced by the majoritarian formula. 
- Illustration: 2 parties compete over 10 seats, 5 seats at the constituency level and 5 at the national level. 

SMDP=> party A comes 1st in constituency=> wins all 5 seats. 
PR=> party A wins 60% of votes=> 60% of seats=> 3 seats. 
=> 8 seats. 
Party B: no constituency seat but 40% of party list seats=> 2 seats. 


PR=> party A: 60% of votes=> 60% of seats=> 6 seats. 
SMDP: party A comes 1st in constituency=> all 5 seats. 
=> 1 party list seat. 
Party B: 40% of votes=> 40% of seats=> 4 seats. 
=> no constituency seats but 4 party list seats. 
=> dependent: more proportional. 
advantages and disadvantages of list PR system. 
other disadvantage: 2 classes of legislators (responsible and accountable to a geographical constituency, and more beholden to a party)=> influence the cohesiveness of parties. 

IV/ Electoral systems around the world: 
- Dictatorships are much more likely to use majoritarian electoral systems than democracies. 
=> easier to manipulate. 

Notes from "Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies: Making and Breaking Governments"

Chapter 12 of Principles of Comparative Politics (William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder and Sona Nadenichek Golder)


- Classifying democracies (the presence of a president isn't sufficient):
Is the government responsible to the elected legislature?
+ No: Presidential democracies (the government doesn't depend on a legislative majority to exist). 
E.g 2008: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, the US, Venezuela, etc.
+ Yes=> Is the head of state popularly elected for a fixed term of office?

• Yes: Semi-presidential. E.g 2008: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Niger, Poland, Portugal, Taiwan, etc.
• No: Parliamentary. E.g 2008: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Thailand, the UK, etc.

- Legislative responsibility: a legislative majority has the constitutional power to remove the government from office without cause.
A vote of no confidence: initiated by the legislature; if the government doesn't obtain a legislative majority in this vote, it must resign.
(A constructive vote of no confidence must indicate who will replace the government if the incumbent loses a vote of no confidence=> to reduce instability).
A vote of confidence: initiated by the government; if the government doesn't obtain a legislative majority in this vote, it must resign.
- A head of state is popularly elected if voters either cast ballots directly for the candidate they wish to elect, or cast ballots to elect an assembly (sometimes called an electoral college), whose sole role is to elect the head of state.
To serve a fixed term: the head of state serves for a fixed period of time before he needs to be reappointed and cannot be removed from office in the meantime.

I/ Making and breaking governments: Parliamentary democracies
- Government= a PM (political chief executive and head of government) + a cabinet (composed of ministers whose job it is to be in the cabinet and head the various government departments).

- An investiture vote is a formal vote in the legislature to determine whether a proposed government can take office. Absolute majority or plurality.
A caretaker government occurs when an election is called or when an incumbent government either resigns or is defeated in a vote of no confidence=> rules the country for an interim period until a new government is called.

- 2 types of politicians:
+ An office-seeking politician: interested in the intrinsic benefits of office; wants as much office as possible.
=> To other party leaders: "I'll give you X ministerial posts in the government in exchange for your legislative support".
=> Gamson's law: the cabinet portfolios will be distributed among government parties in strict proportion to the number of seats that each party contributes to the government's legislative majority.

• Minimal winning coalition: there are no parties that are not required to control a legislative majority.
• Least minimal winning coalition: MWC with the lowest number of surplus seats.

+ A policy-seeking politician: only wants to shape policy.
A connected coalition: 1 in which the member parties are located directly next to each other in the policy space.

-  Different types of government:
+ Minority government: the party or parties in power don't explicitly command a majority of legislative seats (=> implicit majority in the legislature that supports it).

• more likely when opposition influence is strong.
• more likely in corporatist countries (corporatist interest groups relations occur when key social/ economic actors- labour, business, agriculture groups, are integrated into the formal policymaking process; as opposed to pluralist interest group relations, which occur when interest groups compete in the political marketplace outside of the formal policymaking process).
• less likely when there's a formal investiture vote (when rules are positive- investiture votes required=> the onus is on the government to demonstrate that it's supported; when rules are negative=> the onus is on the parliament to show that the government's not tolerated).

+ Surplus majority government: the cabinet includes more parties than are strictly necessary to control a majority of legislative seats.
Preelectoral coalition: collection of parties that don't compete independently at election times.
Government coalition: coalition that forms after election.

II/ Making and breaking governments: Presidential democracies
- Government: a president+ a cabinet.
Doesn't have to maintain majority legislative support in order to maintain office=> doesn't have to negotiate.
- Portfolio coalition: composed of those legislators belonging to parties in the cabinet.
Legislative coalition: voting bloc composed of legislators who support a piece of legislation.

- Presidential decree: an order by the president that has the force of law.
Presidents can achieve their policy goals either through the legislature or through decrees.
Weak decree power/ small party in the legislature/ party exhibiting low level of party discipline=> likely to appoint cabinets that are like those from parliamentary democracies=> more partisan ministers, more proportional allocation of cabinet portfolios.

III/ Making and breaking governments: Semi-presidential democracies
- Government: A PM+ a cabinet.
- 2 types:
+ Premier-presidential system: government responsible to the legislature but not the president. As the name suggests, the reins of power are firmly with the "premier" or prime minister and the president is not considered part of the executive. 
Looks and functions like parliamentary democracies with a presidential head of state. Only difference: popularly elected for a fixed term of office.
+ President- parliamentary system: government responsible to the legislature and the president. As the name suggests, the president is much more powerful in this system and considered part of the executive. The functions may vary, but it is often the case that the president has more influence in matters of foreign policy and the PM's more powerful in domestic politics. 

=> Responsibility of government in each type of democracy:


________________________________________________________

- Delegation occurs when 1 person/ group, called the principal, relies on another person/ group, called an agent, to act on the principal's behalf.
e.g in life: patient/ customer: principal, doctor/ mechanic: agent.
- Direct democracy: form of government in which people collectively make decisions for themselves.
Representative democracy: form of government where citizens delegate power to elected individuals to represent them and act on their behalf.
- A principal-agent, or delegation, problem: difficulties that arise when a principal delegates authority to an agent who potentially has different goals from the principal and cannot be perfectly monitored.
Agency loss: difference between the actual consequence of delegation and what the consequence would have been had the agent been perfect (= does what a principal would have done had the principal been the agent).
- Adverse selection: the agent has attributes that are hidden from the principal.
Moral hazard: the agent has the opportunity to take actions that are hidden from the principal.
=> These problems can be mitigated if the principal can gather more information about the agent.
=> ex ante mechanism: helps principals to learn about their agents before these agents are chosen (election campaign, debates, screening, etc.)
or ex post mechanism: used to learn about agents' actions after they have occurred.

• police patrol system: principals monitor the actions of their agents themselves (public hearings).
• fire alarm system: principals rely on information from others to learn about what the agents are doing (media).

Writers who have shaped my ideas about literature

http://somanybooksblog.com/2009/03/12/writers-who-have-influenced-me-meme/
However, instead of making such a general list, I'm going to write about 2 writers who have shaped my ideas about literature.
1st was Vladimir Nabokov, through his novels as well as his writings/talks about literature, especially the lectures. As you can see, he's the 3rd most-written-about writer on his blog, frequently quoted and referred to when I'm writing about literature/ reading in general, or about other writers. I suppose you can also find some trace of Nabokov's influence in my posts about Dostoyevsky, D. H. Lawrence, the Brontes, Turgenev, E. L. Doctorow, etc. Of course, I have my own opinions, e.g I see Dostoyevsky's shortcomings and think him a thinker rather than an artist but still love his works, but it's thanks to Nabokov that I've formed my ideas about literature, about good writers and good readers, about language, about the importance of details, about perspective and subjectivity, about philistines and philistinism, about poshlostism, about learning to "hoist ourselves just a little higher than we generally are in order to sample the rarest and ripest fruit of art which human thought has to offer", etc.
Later came Lev Tolstoy. The discovery of Tolstoy officially introduced me to Russian literature and other Russian greats such as Dostoyevsky, Chekhov, Turgenev, Leskov, etc. (though previously I had read some works by Ostrovsky, Paustovsky, Bulgakov...), but more importantly, reading Anna Karenina for the 1st time was a shock, a revelation, an enlightenment, a "marker" in my life of reading after which everything's changed forever. Having read Anna Karenina, and a year later, War and Peace, I realised that I could never look at literature the same way again. Tolstoy's an ideal, a standard. A painter, a psychologist, he showed me what could be done with a pen, and at the same time taught me about empathy, changed my way of looking at life, and other people, and myself. For that I am grateful. If Nabokov has influenced me in the act of reading, Tolstoy has influenced me on a more personal level, his works have an impact on my life and way of thinking.
If only they also helped me write better. If only.

Notes- The economic effects of democracy

From Knutsen's lecture.

Question: Is a democratic regime compatible with desired social and economic outcomes- high economic growth, low inequality, high wages, better education, etc?
=> CGG (Clark, Golder, Golder- Principles of Comparative Politics): sceptical.
=> may be too quick and simplistic.
=> Many studies, especially recent studies: positive effect of democracy on growth, property rights protection, health, education, etc.
Democracy: minimum level of growth.
Dictatorship: large variation=> different kinds of dictatorships?

- Przeworski and Limongi: 4 arguments on regime and growth: 
+ Democracy=> property rights protection=> growth.
=> P&L: indeterminate.
=> CGG: similar (not a strong link between democracy and property rights protection).
+ Dictatorship=> reduce consumption=> increase saving=> increase investment=> growth.
=> P&L: score for dictatorship.
=> CGG: question the validity of the argument- huge differences between dictatorships.
+ Dictatorship: leaders autonomous from general public and special interest groups=> pursue unpopular, growth-enhancing policies=> growth.
=> P&L: score for dictatorship.
=> CGG: question the validity of the argument- what if the leaders don't care about growth?
+ Autonomous dictators may be predatory.
=> P&L: score for democracy.

- Democracy and property rights protection:
+ Property rights protection=> economic certainty => incentive to work hard and invest=> growth.
+ CGG are sceptical but their counterexamples are only exceptions: Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore, Pinochet's Chile, etc.
Most empirical studies find that democracies protect property better.
- Why democracy might harm proper rights:
The Meltzer-Richards model: the median voter in democracies is relatively poor (poorer than the average) whereas the median member of winning coalition in dictatorships is relatively rich=> more taxation and redistribution in democracies=> disincentive for investment=> reduced growth.
But:

• In democracies the rich are more likely to vote+ to influence policies (credible exit threat).
• Rulers in democracies have to think of elections=> can't tax too high.
• Not proved empirically.

- Why democracy might strengthen property rights:

• Autocratic rulers may expropriate property and redistribute to themselves or close allies (economic. political motivations).
• Weaker checks on autocratic rulers=> easier for expropriation.
• Elections, role of free media in monitoring the actions of leaders in democracies.
• Democracy: large winning coalition=> provide public goods rather than selectively allocate private goods (e.g expropriated property) to political backers.

- Democracy and consumption vs saving/ investment: 1 of the classic arguments on why democracy may be bad for growth.
+ Physical capital investment as an immediate determinant of growth.
+ Income may be consumed or saved: saved=> invested=> increasing productive capacity in the future.

• Dictatorial regimes are better at constraining consumption (public and/or private)=> increase saving.
• Can resist demands of large population segments for public spending.
• Can push through unpopular policies that reduce private consumption (e.g ban on tourism).
• No provision of public security, education, etc=> induce people to save privately.
• Democracy: redistribution of wealth to the relatively poor=> these groups save a smaller fraction of their incomes than the relatively rich.

- Democracy and human capital:
+ Democracy=> human capital=> growth.
(indirect effects).
+ Baum and Lake: democracy enhances growth through:

• increasing life expectancy in poor countries.
• increasing secondary school enrolment ratios in rich countries.

+ Knutsen: expanding data material back to 1820=> fairly robust positive effect of democracy on growth.
=> the main channel through which democracy enhances growth is not human capital but technological change.

- Variation within groups of regimes:
+ Variation between different democratic and dictatorial regimes.
=> more specific institutional set-up?
+ Significantly larger variation among dictatorships.

• Particular leader matters more for growth in dictatorships (not much in democracies).
• 1-party regimes+ dictatorships with legislatures+ dictatorships with autonomous winning coalition (not at mercy of particular leader) grow faster.

- Evans and Rauch:
+ Growth depends on governance.
+ State bureaucracies with Weberian characteristics (meritocratic recruitment, predictable long-term career rewards)

• => competence.
• share similar abilities=> internalise shared norms and goals (more than those who know they owe their office to the favour of a kinsman/ patron).
• reduce the attractiveness of the quick returns available from corrupt practices.
• increase propensity to advocate public-sector infrastructure in investment rather than consumptive expenditures.

=> growth.

Ibex

Probably the funniest thing ever. Or silliest. 

Villette and Jane Eyre, or Lucy and Jane

I've finished reading Villette. 
It is a very different book from Jane Eyre. Yes there's passion, there's intensity, there's a woman alone who earns her own living, but, for 1 thing, Jane Eyre and Lucy Snowe are different- though both are introverted in nature and at the same time forced by circumstances to be alone, both have to earn money for themselves so as not to burden anyone else, Lucy's more withdrawn, more solitary, alienated from her surrounding and suffering from loneliness for great portions of the book. That makes the whole tone of Villette different, the mood, the atmosphere different. Jane undergoes hardships and injustice and suffering, but as a child she's close to Helen Burns, later when she works as a governess she's close enough to Adele and finds in Rochester a soulmate. She and Rochester have experience and know much about life from suffering, so they understand each other- in fact, their 1st meetings already show a sense of understanding only between themselves, as Mrs Fairfax cannot join their conversation, nor know what they're talking about. Generally quiet, but Jane can be frank and open, many times she speaks out her mind and on a few occasions has an outburst. 
Lucy most of the time keeps things to herself. Indeed, she does give Ginevra a lecture now and then, indeed, she does talk about Protestantism and Catholicism, indeed, she once talks to a priest of her loneliness, but most of the time she maintains self-control, keeps everything to herself and endures everything alone. She never opens up her soul to anyone. She never has an outburst. She rarely speaks frankly and openly about her private life and feelings. Lucy even keeps a distance from readers- I've never seen any narrator so secretive, she keeps withholding information. 
As I picture the characters in my mind, Lucy and Jane are alike in that their faces are not lively, cheerful, sociable faces, but one can see some fire, some intensity in Jane's eyes, yet nothing, nothing at all in Lucy's. They're just tranquil. 
I don't think Lucy truly has an attachment to anyone in Villette. Ginevra doesn't know anything about her. Madame Beck sees her as an employee and is seen as a employer. Graham and Polly respect her, care for her and confide in her, but there's always a wall Lucy builds between them and herself, she listens but seldom talks, and they are ignorant of her feeling and suffering. Later she becomes closer to and seems to fall in love with Paul Emanuel, but I'm not so sure of that. There's always been more love on his side than on her side, from the beginning, by the time he truly approaches her and opens up to her, she's been despairing, feeling pain for her unrequited love, coping with lonesomeness and questioning the chance of happiness- who knows if she loves him because of his personality and character, or does so as a lonely person that wants attachment. 
Who knows. 

William Faulkner on the human dilemma

... You’re alive in the world. You see man. You have an insatiable curiosity about him, but more than that you have an admiration for him. He is frail and fragile, a web of flesh and bone and mostly water. He’s flung willy nilly into a ramshackle universe stuck together with electricity. The problems he faces are always a little bigger than he is, and yet, amazingly enough, he copes with them — not individually but as a race.
He endures.
He’s outlasted dinosaurs. He’s outlasted atom bombs. He’ll outlast communism. Simply because there’s some part in him that keeps him from ever knowing that he’s whipped, I suppose; that as frail as he is, he lives up to his codes of behavior. He shows compassion when there’s no reason why he should. He’s braver than he should be. He’s more honest.
The writer is so interested — he sees this as so amazing and you might say so beautiful… It’s so moving to him that he wants to put it down on paper or in music or on canvas, that he simply wants to isolate one of these instances in which man — frail, foolish man — has acted miles above his head in some amusing or dramatic or tragic way… some gallant way.
That, I suppose, is the incentive to write, apart from it being fun. I sort of believe that is the reason that people are artists. It’s the most satisfying occupation man has discovered yet, because you never can quite do it as well as you want to, so there’s always something to wake up tomorrow morning to do. You’re never bored. You never reach satiation.

(William Faulkner, http://www.brainpickings.org/2014/09/25/william-faulkner-university-of-virginia-recording/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+brainpickings%2Frss+%28Brain+Pickings%29) 

My reception of Villette

is something like this: 
 *

Please don't think that the last point is my last thought on Villette- I haven't finished reading the book. It's only my state of mind right now, a few scenes after the unfolding of Paul Emanuel's hidden side, the self-sacrificing, saintly (/Christian) side. This is a good, realistic character, 1 of Charlotte Bronte's best, and everything was going very, very well until the revelation scene- improbable and unconvincing and... I don't even have the word. 
Still, the good news is that the general trend is still going up and up and up, so there is chance that it will go up again soon. 
Oh Charlotte Charlotte Charlotte. 







*: And don't take that graph too seriously.